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Casenotes
MOTION PICTURE CENSORSHIP -
A CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA
Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Education'
No less enigmatic than the ancient riddle of the Sphinx
was the recent per curiam decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States reversing the holdings of the highest
courts of New York2 and Ohio3 on the issue of the consti-
tutionality of certain aspects of current motion picture
censorship statutes. The Court of Appeals of New York
had upheld the refusal by the Motion Pictures Division
of the State Education Department and the Regents of the
University of the State of New York to grant a license for
the public exhibition of the motion picture "La Ronde,"
because the reviewing board found that the movie was
"immoral" and would "tend to corrupt morals" within the
meaning of the New York statute. The New York censor-
ship law provides that:
".... the director of the division or, when author-
ized by the regents, the officers of a local office or bureau
shall cause to be promptly examined every motion pic-
ture film submitted to them as herein required, and
unless such film or a part thereof is obscene, indecent,
immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such a char-
acter that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals
or incite to crime, shall issue a license therefor."'
The Ohio court had upheld the banning of the film "M"
on account of its being harmful." The Ohio law states that
"... only such films as are, in the judgment and discretion
of the department of education, of a moral, educational,
or amusing and harmless character shall be passed and ap-
proved by such department."' The censorship puzzle has
I Superior Films, Inc. v. Dept. of Education of the State of Ohio, Film
Censorship Division and Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Uni-
versity of New York, 346 U. S. 587 (1954).
' Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, 305 N. Y. 336, 113
N. E. 2d 502 (1953).
*Superior Films v. Dept. of Education, 159 Oh. St. 315, 112 N. E. 2d
311 (1953).
4 New York Education Law, Sec. 122.
5 Supra, n. 3.
6 Ohio Rev. Code (Anderson's Desk Ed., 1953), Sec. 3305.04.
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been further complicated in Maryland by the recent over-
ruling of the refusal by the Maryland State Board of Motion
Picture Censors to license "The Moon is Blue"7 on the
ground that it was "indecent" and "immoral" within the
meaning of Section 6 of Article 66A of the Annotated Code
of Maryland (1951 Ed.), which provides that "The Board
* . .shall approve and license such films or views which
are moral and proper, and shall disapprove such as are
sacrilegious, obscene, indecent, inhuman or immoral, or
such as tend, in the judgment of the Board, to debase or
corrupt morals or incite to crimes."
The inarticulate majority of the Supreme Court was
content to rest upon the sole cited precedent of Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson.8 The Burstyn or "Miracle Case"
held that motion pictures are within the First Amendment
guarantees of freedom of speech and press, and protected
from invasion of those rights by the states under the Four-
teenth Amendment; and that therefore a state cannot pre-
vent exhibition of a motion picture on the ground that it is
"sacrilegious" because that term as an administrative stand-
ard cannot be objectively and precisely defined and ap-
plied. The "Miracle Case" did not rule whether censorship
of motion pictures in every case is an unconstitutional
exercise of prior restraint upon expression violative of the
free speech and press guarantees of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. Nevertheless, any full discussion of
the present status of motion picture censorship laws must
embrace the twin issues raised before the New York9 and
Ohio" courts and later before the Supreme Court: 11 (1)
constitutional limitations upon restraint of speech or other
forms of communications prior to utterance or publication;
and (2) adequacy of the statutory standards employed by
the agency censoring the film strips.
PRIOR RFSTmAINTS
In order to develop the divergent views on the place of
freedom of speech and press in our constitutional heritage,
let us follow the natural cleavage of the Supreme Court
running through the Jehovah's Witnesses Cases.
' United Artists Corp. v. Traub, Baltimore City Court, Docket 16, Fol. 295,
Dec. 7, 1953. See Daily Record, Dec. 10, 1953.
A343 U. S. 495 (1952).
0 Supra, n. 2.
10 Supra, n. 3.
Supra, n. 1.
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The anti-censorship philosophy of Justices Black and
Douglas, for want of a better label, we shall call the "cate-
gorical view." Their conclusions are based upon a strict
interpretation of the words of the First Amendment. Mr.
Justice Douglas has stated this view succinctly as follows:
"The First and the Fourteenth Amendments say
that Congress and the States shall make 'no law'
which abridges freedom of speech or of the press. In
order to sanction a system of censorship I would have
to say that 'no law' does not mean what it says, that
'no law' is qualified to mean 'some' laws. I cannot take
that step.' 12
This strict interpretation of the First Amendment is neces-
sary, they feel, because of the historic development of free-
dom of press and speech in England and America.
The harbinger of a free press, John Milton, in 1644,
penned his famous Areopagitica attacking the licensing sys-
tem which had straight-jacketed the printed word under
the Tudor and Stuart kings. Chief Justice Hughes in Lovell
v. Griffin 3 reflected:
"The struggle for the freedom of the press was
primarily directed against the power of the licensor.
It was against that power that John Milton directed
his assault by his 'Appeal for the Liberty of Un-
licensed Printing."4 And the liberty of the press be-
came initially a right to publish 'without a license what
")15formerly could be published only with one'.
Blackstone wrote in 1765:
"The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the
nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no
previous restraints upon publications, and not in free-
dom from censure for criminal matter when pub-
lished. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay
what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid
this is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he
publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he
must take the consequence of his own temerity. To
subject the press to the restrictive power of a licensor,
"Ibid. Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Black agrees, in a
memorandum opinion.
303 U. S. 444 (1938).
MILTON, AREOPAGITICA.
Supra, n. 13, 451.
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... is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the preju-
dices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and
infallible judge of all controverted points in learning,
religion and government."'
In seventeenth century America there was no such thing
as a free press. The royal governors were ordered to per-
mit no matter to be printed without "especial leave and
license first obtained."17 Defiance by Colonial editors to
censorship was so effective that by the middle of the eigh-
teenth century a free American press was a fait accompli.
Vestiges of suppression existed only in isolated instances,
such as the suppression exercised,by the Sons of Liberty
vigilantes during the turbulent Stamp Act period.18 As
stated by one commentator:
"Freedom of press was sorely tried in the harsh,
confusing days following the passage of the Coercive
Acts, but American thinkers did their sincere best to
defend the central position they had assigned to this
freedom in the pattern of constitutional government."1
Following closely upon the heels of the Coercive Acts
was John Dickinson's famous "Letter to the Inhabitants
of the Province of Quebec," which was adopted by the
First Continental Congress in October, 1774. That impor-
tant, joint Colonial document declared freedom of the press
as one of the basic rights "without which a people cannot
be free and happy."2 The Virginia Declaration of Rights
in June, 1776, stated that ". . . the freedom of the press is
one of the great bulwarks of liberty, and can never be re-
strained but by despotick (sic) governments."'" Most of the
other original thirteen states adopted similar declarations
or bills of rights which were incorporated into their respec-
tive constitutions in accordance with the fondness of the
Revolutionary generation for written documents to insure
a standing law beyond the caprice of popular rule.22 Thus
'BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (Lewis's Ed., 1902), Vol. IV, 151-2.
'
7 Quoted in RossITER, SEEDTIME OF THE RmPumio (1953), 29.
"MORGAN, EDMUND S. AND HELEN M., THE STAMP ACT CRISIS (1953), 199.
"RosSlTER, op. cit., supra, n. 17, 385.
20 Ibid, 399.
"S. E. MORISON, SOURCES AND DOOUMENTS ILLUSTRATING THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (2d Ed., 1929), 150-1.
The Massachusetts court in 1825 said about its state's guarantees of
free press that:
"The main purpose of such constitutional provisions is '... to prevent
all such previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by
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as we have seen, colonial experience and political expres-
sion set the stage for the insistence by the ratifying con-
ventions upon the incorporation of a declaration of rights
into the new constitution.
In the light of this historical setting therefore, we may
examine the views of the Founding Fathers on the Bill of
Rights in general, and on the First Amendment in par-
ticular, to discover whether these men intended to qualify
the expression "no law abridging the freedom of speech
or of the press." The foremost spokesman for the Con-
stitution as originally drafted, Alexander Hamilton, in
No. 84 of the Federalist scoffed at bills of rights as "stipu-
lations between kings and their subjects, abridgments of
prerogative in favor of privilege, . . .,"2 On the subject
of the liberty of the press, Hamilton stated that:
"... whatever has been said about it in... (the con-
stitution) of any other state, amounts to nothing....
Who can give it any definition which would not leave
the utmost latitude for evasion? I hold it to be im-
practicable; . . . whatever fine declarations may be
inserted in any constitution respecting it, must alto-
gether depend on public opinion, and on the general
spirit of the people and of the government.... the only
solid basis of all our rights."2 4
Madison at first regarded coolly the suggestion that the
proposed constitution needed an additional bill of rights,
and in a letter to Jefferson said:
"My own opinion has always been in favor of a bill
of rights; . . . At the same time I have never thought
the omission a material defect, nor been anxious to
supply it even by subsequent amendment, for any other
reason than that it is anxiously desired by others.
25
other governments .... to stifle the efforts of patriots toward enlighten-
ing their fellow subjects upon their rights and the duties of rulers. The
liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he who used it was to
be responsible In case of its abuse; like the rights to keep fire
arms, which does not protect him who uses them for annoyance or
destruction'."
Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 304, 313 (1825). Also quoted
by Holmes In Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 462 (1907).
1 THE FEDERALIST, (Sesquicentennial Ed.), 558.
21Ibid, 560. Hamilton also cautioned against "aphorisms . . . which
would sound much better In a treatise on ethics than In a constitution of
government." Ibid, 558-9.
I Letter to Thos. Jefferson, October 17, 1788. See S. K. PADOVR, THn
COMPLEYrE MADISON (1953), 253.
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But
"supposing a bill of rights to be proper ... I am in-
clined to think that absolute restrictions in cases that
are doubtful, or where emergencies may overrule them,
ought to be avoided. The restrictions however strongly
marked on paper will never be regarded when opposed
to the decided sense of the public, and after repeated
violations in extraordinary cases they will lose even
their ordinary efficacy."26
Yet Madison later championed the proposed bill of rights
before the First Congress stating that "the freedom of the
press and rights of conscience, those choicest privileges of
the people, are unguarded in the British Constitution."2
In America, he said after the Bill of Rights had been
adopted,
" '... . the great and essential rights of the people are
secured against legislative as well as against executive
ambition . . .not by laws paramount to prerogative,
but by constitutions paramount to laws. This security
of the freedom of the press requires that it should be
exempt not only from previous restraint by the Execu-
tive, as in Great Britain, but from legislative restraint
also'." 2
Op. cit., ibid, 255. This correspondence with Jefferson illustrates the
balanced, intellectual approach Madison took toward the constitutional
Issues facing the new nation. His writings reveal an amazing foresight
and regard for the consequences of the extension of the accepted axiomatic
doctrines of his day into the pattern of an expanding society. Prof. E. S.
Corwin has said that "as to Madison's paternity of the Constitution . . . I
think If 'there had to be a Father of the Constitution, . ..Madison was
probably the most eligible candidate." 27 New York Univ. L. Rev. (1952),
277, 298.
In the same speech he said:
"Although I know whenever the great rights, the trial by jury, free-
dom of the press, or liberty of conscience, come in question in that body
(Parliament), the Invasion of them is resisted by able advocates, yet
their Magna Charta does not contain any one provision for the security
of those rights, respecting which the people of America are most
alarmed."
From 1 Annals of Congress 1789-1790, 434. Quoted in Bridges v. California,
314 U. S. 252, 264 (1941). Parenthetical material supplied.
21 From REPORT ON THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS, MADISON'S WORKS, Vol. 4,
543. Quoted by Hughes, C.J., in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 714 (1931).
Compare the above passage with Hamilton's No. 84 of THE FEtERAmST,
aupra, n. 23. The Virginia Resolutions, attributed to Madison, stated:
"That this state, having, by its Convention which ratified the Federal
Constitution, expressly declared that, among other essential rights,
'the liberty of conscience and of the press cannot be cancelled, abridged,
restrained or modified by any authority of the United States' and ...
having, with other states, recommended an amendment for that
purpose, ...."
H. S. COAMAGER, DocuMNTS or AMERICAN HisTORY (5th Ed., 1949), 182.
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From these and similar gems of our rare heritage, Jus-
tices Black and Douglas believe they have discovered for-
midable precedents for a categorical interpretation of the
First Amendment. In other words the Founding Fathers
meant what they said, when they framed the amendment
in such absolute terms. Jefferson had suggested to Madison
that the First Amendment should read:
"The people shall not be deprived of their right to
speak, to write, or otherwise to publish anything but
false facts affecting injuriously the life, liberty, prop-
erty or reputation of others or affecting the peace of
the confederacy with foreign nations."2
Is not that right as defined by Jefferson essentially that
First Amendment freedom of speech and press concerning
which "no law" can be passed in abridgment? "Freedom of
speech," says Mr. Justice Douglas, "though not absolute,
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,"° is nevertheless protected
against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to
produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive
evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance,
or unrest."' 1 The First Amendment is inapplicable to cer-
tain words in the nature of verbal acts,32 defined by Justice
Murphy in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire3 as "the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
'fighting' words - those which by their very utterance in-
flict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace."8 Summing up in the words of Justice Black, "...
the only conclusion supported by history is that the un-
qualified prohibitions laid down by the framers were in-
tended to give to liberty of the press, as to the other liber-
ties, the broadest scope that could be countenanced in an
orderly society.""8
"Letter to Madison, 1789. From S. K. PADovE,, THOMAS JEFFERSON ON
DEMocRAcy, (Mentor Book) 48. Alexander Hamilton defined the liberty of
the press as "the right to publish with impunity, truth, with good motives,
for justifiable ends though reflecting on government, magistracy, or in-
dividuals." People v. Croswell, 3 Johns (N. Y.) 337. For the relationship
of criminal libel to the scope of free speech and press, see COOLEY, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LIMITATIONS (8th Ed., 1927), Vol. 2, Ch. 12.
- 315 U. S. 568 (1942).
9Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 4 (1949).
2 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911).
Supra, n. 30.
Ibid, 572.
8MBridges v. California, supra, n. 27, 265. This so-called "preferred posi-
tion" given free speech is attacked by Justice Frankfurter in his con-
curring opinion in ;Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 89 (1949), noted in 10
Md. L. Rev. 355 (1949).
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Though frequently colored by dissents, the holdings in
the free speech cases reveal that the Supreme Court has
repeatedly condemned censorship in its various disguises.
While prior restraints by way of injunction have been
countenanced under certain circumstances,36 the Court has
struck down censorship by administrative action. For ex-
ample, administrative action was found repugnant to the
Constitution under statutes requiring that a license be
obtained from a public official prior to publication or utter-
ance where the following media of communication were
involved: distribution of religious handbills;37 use of sound
trucks;31 public meeting or speechmaking on public prop-
erty;39 solicitation of union membership;40 door-to-door can-
vassing for the distribution of religious publications4' or
soliciting funds for religious purposes. 42 Other statutes in-
volving unlawful suppression of expression: imposed a
license tax on newspapers 3 or religious publications ;44
involved peaceful picketing;45 forbade printing of a news-
paper that is "malicious, scandalous and defamatory."46
However, there are a few cases permitting previous re-
straints on the grounds either that the First Amendment
does not apply;4 7 or because the limitations upon the ad-
ministrator are such that he is prevented from discriminat-
ing against any utterances of which he does not approve.48
'"Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Co., 312 U. S. 287 (1941), and Giboney
v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U. S. 490 (1949), involving picketing.
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938) ; Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147
(1939) ; Largent v. Texas, 318 U. S. 418 (1943).
81 Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948), noted in 9 Md. L. Rev. 285
(1948).
T Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U. S. 496 (1939) ; Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290
(1951) ; Niemotko v. Md., 340 U. S. 268 (1951).
40 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945).
"Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943).
2 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U. S. 233 (1936).
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943) ; also Jones v. Opelika,
319 U. S. 103 (1943), rev'g. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 584 (1942).
'5Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940).
"Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 701 (1931).
"1 Where the words are in the nature of verbal acts, 8upra, circa, n. 32.
See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911). According
to Justice Murphy In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, "There are certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any constitutional
problem." Supra, n. 30, 571. Cf. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S.
624 (1943) ; Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Indus'l Comm., 236 U. S. 2:30 (1915).
4Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941) ; Kovacs v. Cooper, 3.36
U. S. 77 (1949). Justice Douglas attacked such reasoning as an "ominous
and alarming trend". ". . . the Court . . . has engrafted the right of regula-
tion onto the First Amendment by placing in the hands of the legislative
branch the right to regulate 'within reasonable limits' the right of free
speech." Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250 (1952), dis. op., 284, 285.
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On the basis of the latter reasoning, a conviction of a Jeho-
vah's Witness was upheld under a New Hampshire statute
prohibiting an unlicensed parade upon a public street or
highway.49. Another 5-4 decision upheld a statute which
forbade sound trucks to operate on streets when amplified
to a loud and raucous volume. 0 A conviction of the parents
under the Massachusetts child labor laws was upheld where
Jehovah's Witnesses literature was being distributed by a
nine year old child on the streets of a city."'
Movie censorship was given the green light in the Mu-
tual decision52 in 1915, where it was said of the infant mo-
tion picture industry that movie exhibition was "a business
pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, ...
not to be regarded, . . . as part of the press of the country
or as organs of public opinion."53 Thirty-seven eventful
years later, "in an age when 'commerce' in the Constitution
has been construed to include airplanes and electromagnetic
waves," '54 the Supreme Court recognized the maturity of
the industry in the Burstyn case,5  holding that "expression
by means of motion pictures is included within the free
speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments."5 But to the chagrin of Justices Black and
Douglas, the Court dodged the issue of whether "the Con-
stitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion
picture of every kind at all times and all places. '57
Mr. Justice Frankfurter conceived the First Amend-
ment not as a monument inscribed in the ineradicable pre-
cepts of the Founding Fathers, but rather as an organic
thing; dynamic, yet sensitive to the conflicting rights and
interests so ubiquitous in the modern community. During
the arguments before the Court in our principal case,58 it
has been reported that the Associate Justice "took issue
with counsel's position that all censorship was banned.
He wondered whether it was necessary to go that far and
"9 Ibid.
0Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949), noted in Md. L. Rev. 355 (1949).
5Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944).
5Mutual Films Oorp. v. Ohio Indus'l Comm., supra, n. 47.
Ibid, 244.
"CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941), 545. Chafee con-
tended that movie censorship was unconstitutional, and suggested as a sub-
stitute, appraisal of objectionable films by a jury, after Indictment.
J oseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495 (1952).
Ibid, 502.
"Ibid. In a recent decision by the Toledo Municipal Court (Ohio), State
v. Smith, 108 N. E. 2d 582 (1952), it was held that the Ohio censorship law
was unconstitutional when applied to newsreels.
"Superior Films, Inc. v. Ohio, 346 U. S. 587 (1954).
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stated, 'Why lawyers insist on absolutes is something I'll
never understand!' "" The same mystery had apparently
haunted him earlier in the Burstyn case where in a con-
curring opinion Mr. Justice Frankfurter succinctly stated
his position on movie censorship in his singular brand of
rhetoric, as follows:
"We are asked to decide this case by choosing be-
tween two mutually exclusive alternatives: that mo-
tion pictures may be subjected to unrestricted censor-
ship, or that they must be allowed to be shown under
any circumstances. But only the tyranny of absolutes
would rely on such alternatives to meet the problems
generated by the need to accommodate the diverse in-
terests affected by the motion pictures in compact
modern communities. It would startle Madison and
Jefferson and George Mason could they adjust them-
selves to our day, to be told that the freedom of speech
which they espoused in the Bill of Rights authorizes
a showing of 'The Miracle', from windows facing St.
Patrick's Cathedral in the forenoon of Easter Sunday,
just as it would startle them to be told that any pic-
ture, whatever its theme and its expression, could
be barred from being commercially exhibited. The
general principle of free speech, expressed in the First
Amendment as to encroachments by Congress, and
included as it is in the Fourteenth Amendment, bind-
ing on the States, must be placed in its historical and
legal contexts. The Constitution, we cannot recall too
often, is an organism, not merely a literary compo-
sition."60
In other opinions, Mr. Justice Frankfurter has been
critical of the Court's attempted crystalization of rigid
rules to be determinative of all cases, instead of recogniz-
ing the need for flexibility of application. In Niemotko v.
Maryland, he said:
"The results in these multifarious cases have been
expressed in language looking in two directions. While
the Court has emphasized the importance of 'free
speech,' it has recognized that 'free speech' is not in it-
self a touchstone. The Constitution is not unmindful
of other important interests, such as public order, if
22 U. S. Law Week 3182, Jan. 12, 1954.
Supra, n. 55, 517-518.
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interference with free expression of ideas is not found
to be the overbalancing consideration."6'
Such is the essence of the Frankfurtian rationale. His
searching analysis in each case generally results in a con-
demnation of jurisprudence by formulas or absolutes. He
denounces the so-called "preferred position"" given the
First Amendment freedoms as a "mischievous phrase,""
which mechanically applied subtly implies that "any law
touching communication is infected with presumptive in-
validity. '64
Likewise, Justice Jackson dissented in most of the
Jehovah's Witnesses cases. He dissented from the proposi-
tion that "Courts must balance the various community in-
terests in passing on the constitutionality of local regula-
tions . . ." saying: "It is for the local communities to bal-
ance their own interests - that is politics - and what
courts should keep out of."6 The Court has been striking
"rather blindly at permit systems which indirectly may
affect First Amendment freedoms.... I think that where
speech is outside of constitutional immunity the local com-
munity or the State is left a large measure of discretion as
to the means for dealing with it."'6 7
With the present diversity of opinion in the Court, it is
not likely that our motion picture censorship laws will be
adjudged unconstitutional abridgments of freedom of
speech and press solely on the ground of prior restraint.
Only a change in personnel or an about-face could accom-
plish that end. But what may constitute a sufficiently defi-
nite administrative standard is a matter of conjecture at
best.
STANDARDS
The Fourteenth Amendment says that no state shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." "Liberty," encompassing the First
'Ao U. S. 268 (1951), conc. op., 273, 282, Justice Frankfurter set up four
criteria for deciding the free speech cases: (1) interest deemed to require
regulation; (2) method used to achieve such ends; (3) mode of speech;
(4) where the speaking takes place.
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949), conc. op., 89, 90.
'Ibid.
Ibid.
Expressed by Justice Douglas in Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558,
562 (1948).
wIbid, di8. op., 566, 571.
6Dissenting in Kunz v. New York, 240 U. S. 290 (1951), dis. op., 295,
305, 309. In the free speech cases Justice Burton usually concurs with
either J. Jackson or J. Frankfurter, or both.
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Amendment freedoms of speech and press,8 applies to the
exhibition of motion pictures0 9 The elusive phrase "due
process of law" circumscribes limitations on procedures by
which the states can regulate the movies. The primary
requisite of "due process" when applicable to a Board of
Motion Picture Censors is that, in making its determina-
tion to ban a movie, or portion thereof, the board may use
only such fixed standards as prevent the showing of a
motion picture creating a clear and present danger to the
moral well being of the community, but which preserve
the right to exhibit any other motion picture, however ob-
noxious to the censor's own personal opinions. 70 To frame
the statute which meets those requirements is extremely
trying; for if the statute is too strict, it becomes unenforce-
able against the evil it was framed to prevent.7 1 There-
fore, a certain latitude of discretion must be allowed the
reviewing board; and within such limits, protection from
abuse is provided for by judicial review.
The Supreme Court has invalidated several State or local
statutes because the laws were so vague and indefinite as
to leave the door open to arbitrary restriction of the free-
doms of expression. In Winters v. New York72 a conviction
of a bookdealer was set aside on the grounds that the penal
statute,73 while limiting freedom of expression, was so
vague and indefinite that it failed to "give fair notice of
what acts will be punished, ' 74 and therefore violated "an
accused's right under procedural due process and freedom
of speech or press. '75 In Kunz v. New York76 the Supreme
Court declared void a statute creating a licensing system
which vests "in an administrative official discretion to grant
or withhold a permit (to use streets and parks) upon broad
criteria unrelated to proper regulation of public places.''17
Gelling v. Texas" set aside an ordinance authorizing a li-
"Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925).
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495 (1952).
Cf., ibid.; also Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931) ; Herndon
v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937) ; Gelling v. Texas, 343 U. S. 960 (1952) ;
Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 (1948) ; Kunz v. New York, 8upra, n. 67.
"Winters v. New York, ibid. (Justice Frankfurter, dissenting).
"Ibid.
"' Sec. 1141(2) of New York Penal Law (conviction was for having for
sale a publication "principally made up of criminal news, police reports, or
accounts of criminal deeds or pictures or stories of deeds of bloodshed,
lust or crime.")
71 Supra, n. 70, 509.
Ibid, 510.
16 Supra, n. 67.
7 Ibid, 294. Parenthetical material supplied.
11 Supra, n. 70.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
censing board to deny a license to show a motion picture
which, in its opinion, was" 'of such character as to be preju-
dicial to the best interests of the people of said City'. '7
In the Burstyn v. Wilson case, the term "sacrilegious"
was under attack. Justice Frankfurter in a lengthy con-
curring opinion collected some thirty-four definitions of
the word using about every dictionary ever published in
the English language.80 Delivering the opinion of the Court,
Mr. Justice Clark described the plight of the hapless censor
in trying to apply the term "sacrilegious" to the subject
matter of a motion picture:
".... the censor is set adrift upon a boundless sea
amid a myriad of conflicting currents of religious views,
with no charts but those provided by the most vocal
and powerful orthodoxies."'"
Does the same sea exist when morality is the issue? In
"The Moon Is Blue" case in the Baltimore City Court, Judge
Moser said of the Maryland State Board of Motion Picture
Censors:
"... the Board indicated quite clearly that it has no
'fixed standards' by which to interpret what is inde-
cent, obscene and immoral . . . The following is clear
from the record in this case.
(a) The Chairman flatly stated, 'We have no set
standards'.
(b) The Vice Chairman approved banning the film
because it was 'trash', defined as 'just no good'.
(c) The standard of the third member was what
he wanted his three grandchildren, under twelve years
of age, to see. 81 2
The requirement of certainty in a statute may be met
either by language or by settled construction.bs "Even in
Mutual Film Corporation v. Ohio Industrial Commission'
... it was deemed necessary to find that the terms 'educa-
tional, moral, amusing or harmless' do not leave 'decision
to arbitrary judgment.' Such general words were found to
" Ibid.
0 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495 (1952), cono. op., 507,
circa 520 ct seq., and appendix 533.
8Ibid, pp. 504-5.
2 United Artists Corp. v. Traub, Daily Record, Dec. 10, 1953.
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951).
236 U. S. 230 (1915).
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'get precision from the sense and experience of men.' "85
The Ohio court said the tests of the Ohio censorship statute
"have over a period of over 40 years acquired a definite and
circumscribed meaning.' ' 6 Apparently the Supreme Court
did not think so.
The New York court majority in the "La Ronde" caS T
was unable to agree on the meaning of "immoral." Froessel,
J. said, ..... the words 'immoral' and 'tend to corrupt morals'
... relate to standards of sexual morality.... In this sense
they are kindred to 'obscene' and 'indecent'.. .,"I A second
judge defined "immoral" as contra bonos mores. A third
wanted the latter definition to embrace the former. The
dissenting judges said the meaning was indeterminate since
the majority of the Court could not reach a uniform con-
clusion. To cure the dilemma and to satisfy the Supreme
Court, the New York legislature, in 1954, defined an im-
moral film as one:
"the dominant purpose or effect of which is erotic or
pornographic; or which portrays acts of sexual im-
morality, perversion, or lewdness, or which expressly
or impliedly presents such acts as desirable, acceptable
or proper patterns of behavior. '89
A Federal statute prohibits the importation of "im-
moral" articles, books, etc. "Immoral" has been construed
as "the opposite of moral; ... morally evil or impure, un-
principled, vicious, dissolute." 90 In another catch-all defini-
tion it is said to be:
11... not necessarily confined to matters sexual in
their nature; it may be that which is contra bonos
mores . . .; or 'not moral, inconsistent with rectitude,
purity, or good morals; contrary to conscience or moral
law; wicked; vicious; licentious, as, an immoral man or
deed.' . . . Its synonyms are: corrupt, indecent, de-
praved, dissolute."91
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, supra, n. 80, 519.
Superior Films v. Dept. of Education, 159 Oh. St. 815, 112 N. E. 2d 311,
320 (1953).81 Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, 305 N. Y. 336, 113 N. E.
2d 502 (1953).
Ibid, 507.
81 New York Education Law, See. 122-a (1).
91 United States v. One Obscene Book Entitled "Married Love", 48 F. 2d
821, 823 (D.C., S.D., N.Y., 1931) ; and in United States v. One Book Entitled
"Oontraception", 51 F. 2d 525, 527 (D.C., S.D., N.Y., 1931).
Schuman v. Pickert, 277 Mich. 225, 269 N. W. 152, 154 (1936). For other
definitions see 42 C.J.S. 395; Exchange Nat]. Bank v. Henderson, 139 Ga.
260, 77 S. E. 36 (1913) ; Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 37 Cal. Sup. 2d
734, 227 P. 2d 449, 456 (1951) ; also 20 Words and Phrases, 150.
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"Immoral" has been equated with "indecent",92 and "in-
decent" held synonymous with "obscene.' ' "R Mr. Traub,
Chairman of the Maryland Board of Censors, while favor-
ing a definition similar to the New York resolution," also
considers a film about narcotics addicts to be immoral.9 5
There have been numerous cases construing the terms
"indecent"96 and "obscene."97 "Acts of gross and open in-
decency or obscenity, injurious to public morals, are in-
dictable at common law.. ."98 In the Burstyn case the Court
left open the question "whether a state may censor motion
pictures under a clearly drawn statute designed and applied
to prevent the showing of obscene films."9
The New York legislature saw fit in 1954 to delineate a
film that "incites to crime" as one:
"the dominant purpose or effect of which is to sug-
gest that the commission of criminal acts or contempt
for law is profitable, desirable, acceptable or respec-
table behavior; or which advocates or teaches the use
of, . . . narcotics or habit forming drugs."1"
Similar definitions of the operative words of the Mary-
land censorship law 1 might well aid the censorship board
considerably in objectively approving or rejecting films; aid
the movie industry in producing controversial, mature films
without fear of cuts or rejection; and enable the reviewing
court to review the determination of the administrative
body passing upon the character of the motion picture.
Difficulty and doubt will still remain, as well as the broader
question of policy, beyond the scope of this comment, in-
herent in any censorship statute.
Schuman v. Pickert, ibid, 154.93Supra, n. 90. Also Parmelee v. United States, 113 F. 2d 729 (D.C. App.,
1940).
' Supra, n. 89.
9 ' Discussed in Interview with Mr. Traub.
People v. Friedrich, 385 Ill. 175, 52 N. E. 2d 120, 122 (1944) ; King v.
Commonwealth, 313 Ky. 741, 233 S. W. 2d 522, 523 (1950).
q Swearingen v. United States, 161 U. S. 446 (1896) ; United States v.
Levine, 83 F. 2d 156 (2nd Cir., 1936, L. Hand, J.).
18 Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 515 (1948).
9 343 U. S. 495, 506 (1952).
u
0 New York Education Law, Sec. 122-a (2).
110 Md. Code (1951), Art. 66A, Sec. 6.
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